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Abstract
Applyingmachine learning algorithms to private data, such as financial or medical
data, while preserving their confidentiality, is a difficult task. Homomorphic En-
cryption (HE) is acknowledged for its ability to allow computation on encrypted
data, where both the input and output are encrypted, which therefore enables se-
cure inference on private data. Nonetheless, because of the constraints of HE, such
as its inability to evaluate non-polynomial functions or to perform arbitrary matrix
multiplication efficiently, only inference of linear models seem usable in practice
in the HE paradigm so far.
In this paper, we propose Cryptotree, a framework that enables the use of Random
Forests (RF), a very powerful learning procedure compared to linear regression, in
the context of HE. To this aim, we first convert a regular RF to a Neural RF, then
adapt this to fit the HE scheme CKKS, which allows HE operations on real values.
Through SIMD operations, we are able to have quick inference and prediction
results better than the original RF on encrypted data.
1 Introduction
Context. Many areas of Machine Learning have thrived these recent years, nonetheless some do-
mains such as the financial or medical sectors have developed at a slower pace, as they often handle
very sensitive data. While some Machine Learning services could greatly benefit society, allowing
sensitive information to transit from the client to the server could lead to leaks, as the server could
be malicious, or be compromised by a third party and private data could be exposed. Nonetheless,
several solutions have emerged such as Secure Multi Party Computation (13), Trusted Execution
Environments (8), and Homomorphic Encryption (HE). Each one has its own pros and cons, and
throughout this paper we will focus on a solution using the HE paradigm.
HE is an encryption scheme, which allows data owners to encrypt their data, and let a third party
perform computations on it, without knowing what is the underlying data. The result of the compu-
tations on encrypted data can then be sent back to the data owner, which will be the only one able to
decrypt the encrypted result.
More formally, a ring homomorphism h between two rings R and R′, follows those two properties
: h(x + y) = h(x) + h(y) and h(x ∗ y) = h(x) ∗ h(y). This means that if we have an encryption
homomorphism e, a decryption homomorphism d, such that d(e(x)) = x, and a function f , which
is a composition of additions and multiplications, then we can have the following scenario :t he
user encrypts her data x using e, and sends e(x) to an untrusted third party. Then the third party
performs computations f on the encrypted e(x). Because e is an homomorphism, we have that
f(ex(x)) = e(f(x)). The third party sends the data back to the user. Finally the user decrypts the
output, obtaining then d(e(f(x))) = f(x), without exposing her data directly to the untrusted third
party.
Preprint. Under review.
HE schemes first started with (18), as RSA provided an homomorphic scheme, but only with homo-
morphic multiplication. Since then several HE schemes appeared (10),(6), (17), (4), (9) and while
they allowed more and more operations, they remained too computationally heavy for real use. Re-
cently, more practical schemes have emerged such as BGV (21) and BFV (7) for integer arithmetic,
and CKKS (14) for arithmetic on complex numbers. In this paper we will use CKKS, a leveled
homomorphic encryption scheme, which means that addition and multiplication are possible, but a
limited number of multiplications is possible. This is due to the fact that noise is injected to the plain-
text to hide it, but this noise grows during computation, and above a certain threshold the message
cannot be decrypted correctly.
Because of those constraints, the evaluation of a Deep Neural Network (DNN) of arbitrary depth
proves to be difficult: we have a limited number of multiplications, matrix multiplication works
efficiently only on special cases, and non polynomial functions such as ReLU or sigmoid are difficult
to approximate.
However, if we focus on the case of structured data, it is possible to find efficient and expressive
models compatible with CKKS. (11) gave a very efficient way to model RFs as a DNN with two
hidden layers and one output layer, called a Neural Random Forest (NRF). By leveraging this effi-
cient representation of RFs and by tuning it, we show in this paper that one can adapt arbitrary RFs
into Homomorphic Random Forests (HRF) which can do quick inference, and have similar perfor-
mances, if not superior, to the original RF. Thus we show that efficient and expressive models can
be used on encrypted data, therefore paving the way for more privacy friendly Machine Learning.
Our contribution. In this paper we show how Random Forests can be modeled efficiently by first
converting them to Neural Random Forests, and then implementing their Homomorphic Random
Forest counterparts under the CKKS scheme. We show that HRF can leverage the SIMD nature of
CKKS to compute the predictions of each homomorphic tree at the same time, resulting in an effi-
cient and expressive model. We then compare the performances of HRF on a real dataset, the Adult
Income dataset, and show that HRF performs as well as their neural counterpart, and outperforms
the original RF.
We provide a Python implementation of Homomorphic Random Forest in the Cryptotree library,
which uses hooks provided by the TenSEAL library to interact with the C++ SEAL framework
developed by Microsoft for HE schemes. Cryptotree provides a high level API so that users who
do not have notions of HE can convert their Random Forest models to Neural Random Forests first,
fine tune them, then convert these to Homomorphic Random Forests.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 CKKS’s scheme
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Figure 1: Overview of CKKS
We restate the CKKS (14) scheme here. As this is not the main topic of this paper, we will cover
it briefly, underline its shortcomings and we will see how to overcome them when implementing
Homomorphic Random Forests. For the interested reader, a more detailed introduction to CKKS is
provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 1 provides a high level view of CKKS. Let N be a power of two, M = 2N , ΦM (X) =
XN +1, theM -th cyclotomic polynomial of degreeN . For efficiency and security reasons, we will
work with R = Z[X ]/(XN + 1) the ring integer of theM -th cyclotomic polynomial. We can see
that a message m ∈ CN/2 is first encoded into a plaintext polynomial p(X) ∈ R then encrypted
using a public key. Once the message is encrypted into c which is a couple of polynomials, CKKS
provides several operations that can be performed on it, such as addition, multiplication and rotation.
While addition is pretty straightforward, multiplication has the particularity of increasing a lot the
noise kept in the ciphertext, therefore to manage it, only a limited number of multiplications are
allowed. Rotations are permutations on the slots of a given ciphertext. If we denote by f a function
which is a composition of homomorphic operations, then we have that decrypting c˜ = f(c) with the
secret key will yield p˜(X) = f(p(X)). Therefore once we decode it, we will get m˜ = f(m).
Shortcomings. While this introduction to CKKS was rather short, there are a few points to take into
consideration when applying CKKS to Machine Learning. All inputs are represented as a vector
z ∈ CN/2. If the actual dimension of the input is k < N/2, then it will be padded with zeros. This
could be inefficient if operations are done on vectors of dimension k ≪ N/2.
Moreover, only polynomial functions can be computed using the operations allowed in CKKS.
While it is possible to approximate non polynomial functions, for instance using Chebyshev poly-
nomials, only low degree polynomials can be evaluated, as CKKS is a leveled scheme, therefore a
limited number of multiplications are possible. Moreover, a polynomial interpolation is viable only
on a predefined domain, usuallyD = [−1, 1] for Chebyshev interpolation.
Besides, additions and multiplications are done element-wise on the encrypted inputs. This means
that it becomes non trivial to perform simple linear operations such as summing all the coordinates
of a vector, or doing a matrix multiplication between a plaintext matrix and a ciphertext vector.
We see that the last two points, combined with the leveled aspect of CKKS, where only a limited
number of multiplications can be performed, make the evaluation of arbitrary DNN difficult as
we would want to perform any kind of matrix multiplication, and use non polynomial activation
functions.
Linear operations. Nonetheless (12) provides a way to do square matrix multiplication by using
the diagonals of the matrix. Let n = N/2 denote the number of slots available, A ∈ Rn×n and
z ∈ Rn, then we have A.z =
∑n−1
l=0 diag(A, l)⊙ Rotation(z, l).
where . denotes the matrix multiplication, ⊙ denotes the coefficient wise vector multiplication,
diag(A, l) = (A0,l, A1,l+1, ..., An−l−1,n−1, An−l,0, ..., An−1,l−1) is the l-th diagonal of A, and
Rotation(z, l) = (zl+1, zl+2, ..., z1, z2, ..., zl) the rotation of z by shifting l slots to the left.
In practice in CKKS when doing matrix multiplication with a size k < n, the input vector will be
padded with zeros to size n, and the same will happen to the diagonals. Therefore when doing the
rotation, the first elements will be sent to the end, and zeros will come up and give wrong results.
For instance, if we have k = 3, and z = (z1, z2, z3, 0, . . . , 0), when we do a rotation of one slot
we get (z2, z3, 0, . . . , 0, z1) therefore when we multiply the rotated input vector with the padded
diagonal we will not get the correct result. A solution to this would be to first replicate the first k− 1
coordinates of z, yielding z˜ = (z1, . . . , zk, z1, . . . , zk−1, 0, . . . , 0). Therefore each rotation from 0
to k−1 will output the correct vector to be multiplied with the padded diagonal. Here is an example
on vectors of size k = 3 padded to n :

a1,1
a2,2
a3,3
0
. . .
0


⊙


x
y
z
x
y
. . .


+


a1,2
a2,3
a3,1
0
. . .
0


⊙


y
z
x
y
0
. . .


+


a1,3
a2,1
a3,2
0
. . .
0


⊙


z
x
y
0
. . .
0


=


a1,1x+ a1,2y + a1,3z
a2,1x+ a2,2y + a2,3z
a3,1x+ a3,2y + a3,3z
0
. . .
0


3
We generalize this to do L ≥ 1 matrix multiplications at the same time on L different inputs using
only k additions and multiplications (computations are detailed in the Appendix) :
Algorithm 1: PackedMatrixMultiplication
Data: W (1), . . . ,W (L) ∈ Rk×k, z˜ = (z˜(1) | . . . | z˜(L) | 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn
Result: (W1.z1, 0 . . . , 0| . . . |WL.z1, 0 . . . , 0 | 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R
n
1 s← 0 ∈ Rn;
2 for i = 1, . . . , k do
3 for l = 1, . . . , L do
4 D
(l)
k ← diag(W
(l), i) ∈ Rk ; // First we extract the diagonal
5 D
(l)
k ← (D
(l)
k | 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R
2k−1 ; // Then we pad it
6 end
7 Dk ← (D
(1)
k | . . . | D
(L)
k | 0, . . . , 0) ∈ R
n ; // We concatenate them
8 s← s+Dk ⊙ Rotation(z˜, i);
9 end
10 return s
This algorithm is quite interesting as we can perform L matrix multiplications of size k × k at the
constant cost of k multiplications and additions as long as we have that L(2k − 1) ≤ n. This
particularly fits the context of RFs as k would be the depth of the trees, which will is low because
we use shallow trees, and L is high because we have many trees.
Sum reduction of a vector of size k ≤ n can also be performed in a similar fashion. Therefore by
combining element-wise multiplication and sum reduction, we can implement dot product in HE
(more explanations can be found in the Appendix) :
Algorithm 2: DotProduct
Data: x, y ∈ Rk
Result: 〈x, y〉 =
∑k
i=1 xiyi
1 N ← ⌈log2(k)⌉ ; // We compute the number of steps
2 z ← x⊙ y;
3 s← z;
4 for i = 0, . . . , N − 1 do
5 t← Rotate(s, 2i) ; // We rotate and add previous result
6 s← s+ t;
7 t← s;
8 end
9 return s1
2.2 Neural Random Forests
In this section we will see how RFs can be modeled using DNNs. This will serve as a basis for us, as
Neural Random Forests have a nice structure, which will enable us to implement them efficiently in
CKKS. Using trees to initialize DNNs has been already used in the past, as in (20), (2) or (16). We
will focus on the recent work of (11), which models RFs efficiently using a DNN with two hidden
layers and one output layer.
We can see on Figure 2 how a DNN can simulate a decision tree. Imagine that an observation belongs
to the leaf 4. Then based on the decision tree, this means that it started at the root, the node 0, then
went left, went right of the node 1, and finally went left of the node 3. The idea of Neural Random
Forests is to first perform all comparisons at the same time at the first layer, then determine which
leaf the observation belongs to. Each neuron of the second layer represents a leaf, and only one
neuron of the second layer will be activated. The neuron being activated will be the one representing
the leaf where the observation lies, and this is done by using the computed comparisons of the first
layer to determine exactly where the observation is. Finally, once the observation has been located,
the final output layer will simply output the mean of this leaf for regression, or the distribution of
this leaf for classification.
4
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Figure 2: An example of regression tree (top) and the corresponding neural network (down) from
(11)
We will now see more formally how Neural Random Forests are modeled. Let d ∈ N⋆, X = [0, 1]d
our normalized input space, and Y = R the output space for regression, or Y = ∆(RC) the prob-
ability simplex for classification. We assume we are given dataset Dn = ((X1, Y1), ..., (Xn, Yn)),
with n ≥ 2. Let T be a binary decision tree. We denote by K the number of leaves, i.e. terminal
nodes in the tree. Notice that if a binary decision tree hasK leaves, it has necessarilyK− 1 internal
nodes, which represent the comparisons.
Let x ∈ X be an observation, H = (H1, ..., HK−1) be the collection of hyperplanes used in the
construction of T . For k ∈ [1 . . .K − 1] we have that Hk = {x ∈ X : hk(x) = 0}, with
hk(x) = xτ(k) − tk, τ : [1 . . .K − 1] → [1 . . .D] where τ(k) is the index of the variable used in
comparison k, and tk ∈ [0, 1] is the threshold value of the comparison k. Therefore the first linear
layer simply applies comparisons, and apply a non linearity φ(x) = 21x≥0 − 1 which will send to
+1 if the variable was above the threshold or−1 otherwise. Thus theK− 1 outputs of the first layer
are :
uk(x) = φ(xτ(k) − tk), k ∈ [1 . . .K − 1] (1)
The second hidden layer will take theK − 1 output bits ±1, and outputK bits, with 1 bit +1 at the
index of the leaf where the observation belongs to, and -1 everywhere else. To do so, let us denote
by k′ ∈ [1 . . .K] the index of a given leaf, and define vk′(x) one output of the second layer. We will
use non zero weights for the previous uk(x) if and only if the comparison k was used to reach the
leaf k′. The connection has weight +1 if, in that path, the split byHk is from a node to a right child,
and -1 otherwise. Then we have that :
vk′ (x) = φ(
∑
k→k′
Vk,k′uk(x) + bk′), k
′ ∈ [1 . . .K] (2)
where notation k → k′ means that k is connected to k′ and Vk,k′ = ±1 is the corresponding weight.
Here bk′ = −l(k
′) + 12 , with l(k
′) the length of the path from the root to the leaf k′. One important
thing to note when we will implement this later in CKKS is that :
−2l(k′) +
1
2
≤
∑
k→k′
Vk,k′uk(x) + bk′ ≤
1
2
(3)
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More specifically, we have that
∑
k→k′ Vk,k′ (x)uk(x) + bk′ is positive if and only if x belongs to
the leaf k′. Therefore the output of the second layer exactly outputs +1 at the leaf the observation
belongs to, and -1 otherwise.
Finally the output of the tree, denoted T (x) is :
T (x) =
K∑
k′=1
Wk′vk′(x) + β (4)
with β = 12n
∑n
i=1 Yi, Wk′ =
1
2|L
k′
|
∑
i∈L
k′
Yi and Lk′ is the indexes of the observations which
belong to the leaf k′. Note that if we are doing regression we will simply output the mean of the
target in the leaf, and for classification we will output the distribution of classes within that leaf.
While using φ(x) = 21x≥0 − 1 provides exactly the same values as the original tree, this activation
is non differentiable. By using φa(x) = tanh(ax), with a > 0 a hyper-parameter used as a dilatation
factor, it becomes possible to fine tune the DNN.
To generalize from a single tree to a RF with L ≥ 1 trees T (1) . . . T (L), we can simply compute
all predictions in parallel, and given weights αl, take a weighted sum of the output of each tree to
obtain the prediction yˆ of the RF :
yˆ =
L∑
l=1
αlT
(l)(x) (5)
3 Homomorphic Random Forest
In this section, we will present how Neural Random Forests can be adapted in CKKS. We saw in
Section 2.2 that evaluating a NRF can be done using three equations : (1), (2), and (5). Based on
the observation that the first layer is a particular type of sparse matrix multiplication where each row
selects only one variable, and that the last layer can be seen as doing a few dot products if C is low,
we see that to implement HRFs we only need to be able to do a parallel matrix multiplication for
each tree at the second layer.
Instead of performing a matrix multiplication for (1), we decide to let the user directly perform the
linear operation, which is simply a reshuffling of the variables used in the comparison. We chose
to do this because this operation has a high performance cost in CKKS, but can be done directly on
unencrypted data without compromising the confidentiality of the model.
Then for the second layer (2) we will use Algorithm 1 to perform all matrix multiplications in
parallel. Algorithm 1 is particularly well suited for our scenario, because we can evaluate all L trees
at the same time, with no additional cost, no matter the number of inputs d, or the number of trees
L as this operation’s complexity only depends on the number of leavesK .
Finally for the last layer (5), we will compute the score of each class c by noticing that it can
actually be seen as a dot product between v and a vector Wc as yˆc =
∑L
l=1 αlT
(l)
c (x) =∑L
l=1 αl(
∑K
k′=1W
(l)
c,k′v
(l)
k′ (x)+β
(l)
c ) = 〈Wc, v〉+βc whereWc is the concatenation of the weighted
c-th rows of eachW (l), plus a bias that is a weighted sum of the biases of the L trees for class c. We
will therefore use Algorithm 2 to compute this homomorphically.
One important detail is that we will use a polynomial approximation P of degree m of the regular
activation φa used in NRF in equations (1) and (2). As such, we need to make sure that the output
of the first and second linear layers are in [−1, 1]. While it is easy to check this for (1), as x ∈ [0, 1]
and t ∈ [0, 1], it is non trivial for (2). Nonetheless, using (3) we see that if we divide it by 2l(k′) the
weights and the bias, we have that the output of the linear part of (2) will be in [−1, 1]. As the final
output layer does not use an activation, we do not need to check if it is in [−1, 1].
We therefore propose Algorithm 3 to evaluate homomorphically a NRF composed of trees (T (l) =
(τ (l), t(l), V (l), b(l),W (l), β(l))), on an input x ∈ X with a polynomial activation function P ∈
R[X ]. For convenience, we suppose that all trees have been padded to the same number of leavesK ,
the V (l) have been padded to square matrices and V (l) and b(l) have been divided by the appropriate
factor so that (2) is in [−1, 1]. We provide in Table 1 an overview of the complexity of each linear
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Table 1: Complexity of each linear layer of HRFs
Addition Multiplication Rotation
First linear layer 1 0 0
Second linear layer K K K
Third linear layer C⌈log2L(2K − 1)⌉ C C⌈log2L(2K − 1)⌉
layer in terms of homomorphic operations. Note that in CKKS additions have a complexity ofO(n),
while multiplications and rotations have a complexity of O(nlog(n)), with n = N/2 the number of
slots in CKKS.
Algorithm 3: HomomorphicRandomForestEvaluation
Data: (τ (l), t(l), V (l), b(l),W (l), β(l)), x ∈ X, P ∈ R[X ]
Result: yˆ ∈ RC
1 Client ; // The client will prepare the data before sending it to the server
2 for l = 1, . . . , L do
3 x˜(l) ← (xτ | 0 | xτ ) ∈ R
2K−1 ; // The input of each tree is replicated
4 end
5 x˜← (x˜(1) | . . . | x˜(L) | 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RN/2 ; // All inputs are concatenated
6 x˜← Encrypt(x˜) ; // After preprocessing the client encrypts the data
7 Server;
8 for l = 1, . . . , L do
9 t˜(l) ← (tτ | 0 | tτ ) ; // Thresholds are prepared similarly to the inputs
10 b˜(l) ← (bτ | 0, . . . , 0) ; // Bias needs only to be padded
11 end
12 t˜← (t˜(1) | . . . | t˜(L) | 0, . . . , 0);
13 b˜← (b˜(1) | . . . | b˜(L) | 0, . . . , 0);
14 u← P (x˜− t˜) ; // We perform the comparisons
15 v ← P (PackedMatrixMultiplication(W
(1)
1 , . . . ,W
(L)
1 , u) + b˜);
/* We then compute leaf scores in parallel */
16 for c = 1, . . . , C do
17 for l = 1, . . . , L do
18 W˜
(l)
c ← (αlW
(l)
c | 0, . . . , 0);
19 end
20 W˜c ← (W˜
(1)
c | . . . | W˜
(L)
c | 0, . . . , 0) ; // We compute the dot product weights
21 βc ←
∑L
l=1 αlβ
(l)
c ;
22 yˆc ← DotProduct(W˜c, v) + βc ; // We compute the score of each class
23 end
24 return yˆ
4 Experimental results
We will see how HRFs perform compared to other baseline models on the Adult Income dataset
(15), which contains 48842 observations of people’s socio-demographics such as age, education, or
employment in order to predict if the person’s salary is higher than 50K annually.
We have kept preprocessing minimal as the goal is not to have the best prediction score, but to see
how HRFs compare to other models. Continuous data was normalized to [0, 1], and categorical data
was label encoded, then normalized to [0, 1] as well. Code and further details about the training and
evaluation can be found in the Appendix.
In order to train a HRF, we first train a regular RF using Scikit-learn. Then we create a Neural
Random Forest Pytorch module, based on the trees of the RF. Because we use polynomial activations
and not hard comparisons, intermediate results will not be exact, i.e. the output of the first and
7
Table 2: Results on the Adult Income Dataset
Model Accuracy Precision Recall F1
Linear 0.819 0.432 0.724 0.541
RF 0.834 0.386 0.876 0.536
NRF 0.845 0.547 0.762 0.637
HRF 0.842 0.491 0.796 0.607
second layers will not be ±1. Therefore it is necessary to fine tune the NRF to make it output good
predictions when dealing with soft intermediate outputs. Nonetheless, one problem emerges, as we
need to make sure that the output of the first and second linear layers are in [−1, 1] otherwise when
using the approximated activation function it will blow up. Therefore, we only fine tuned the last
linear layer, as we do not compute any polynomial after that.
In Table 2 we compare the results of different models on the validation set. As simple baselines, we
added a logistic regression and the original RF. We can see here that the fine tuned NRF actually has
better performances than other models. Nonetheless HRF has very similar results, but not exactly
the same, as noise is introduced during computation and grows over time. In 97.5% of the time,
the NRF and HRF gave the same results. To mitigate the risks of NRF and HRF giving different
outputs, we trained the NRF using Label Smoothing (3), which allowed to make sure the score of
the predicted class is as far as possible from the other scores. As predictions from HRFs are almost
identical to NRFs, the interested reader can read more theoretical and practical results in (11).
5 Related work
(1) provided explanations on how to train and do inference with logistic regression on encrypted
data. On the other hand, DNNs have also been explored in HE, with CryptoNet (5) which shows
how DNN’s with convolutions, pooling and dense layers can be implemented in HE. Inference is
done by batching 8192 images together.
Therefore our model seems to be the most relevant for the case of structured data prediction as it is
more expressive than logistic regression and more practical than DNNs such as CryptoNet. Even
though CryptoNet has good amortized performance when computing on a batch of 8192 samples,
it still requires 570 seconds to process a batch on a PC with a single Intel Xeon E5-1620 CPU
running at 3.5GHz,with 16GB of RAM using C++. This batching of several inputs suffers from
several issues. First of all a user might not care about having her input batched with other inputs and
would want the result as fast as possible. Secondly, in practice it is not possible to batch different
users’ input once they have been encrypted by different public keys, and while it is possible to batch
different users’ input before they have been encrypted, this assumes that the server saw the data in
clear before batching, which defeats the purpose of HE.
In comparison, HRFs have a much quicker inference time (3s on an Intel Core i7 4600U CPU @
2.10GHz with 8GB of RAM using Python with C++ bindings) for a single observation, which is
much more reasonable. Moreover, several inputs can be handled at the same time using a multi-
threaded server. While CryptoNet might have a better amortized performance in theory with batch-
ing, we saw that batching is not likely to be used in practice for most scenarios.
Finally, HRFs do not need much communication compared to SMPC schemes (13), (19), and can be
done without the need of a trusted crypto-provider whose role is to hide each party’s data, therefore
reducing the number of failure nodes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we showed that neuronal approximations of Random Forests can be adapted for in an
homomorphic setting. We have seen that this leads to expressive and fast models for inference on
encrypted structured data. We will investigate in future work how to fine tune all layers, not just the
last one as it is currently done, while preserving the output to be in [−1, 1] for correct polynomial
evaluations.
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7 Broader impact
In a context of scandals around data privacy, and new legislation such as GDPR, both companies,
institutions and individuals long for more privacy friendly services. While the first fields that would
be served from such confidential algorithms are the health and financial sector, nearly every sector
would benefit from it.
We believe that as encrypted protocols such as HTTPS have become the standard, privacy preserving
Machine Learning should become the new standard.
But in order for this revolution to happen, we need both simple, expressive and practical models to
make them adopted by a large community.
While HRFs work only for structured data, they pave the way for practical and accurate inference
of Machine Learning models on encrypted user data. While other solutions provide different trade
offs between practicality and performance, HRFs strike a good balance between those two notions
as it needs little communication as opposed to SMPC, needs no third party, is quick and still can be
extremely expressive, as it is a mix of Random Forests and Neural Networks.
Thanks to these strength, its high level API, and the use cases that can be covered, we think that
Cryptotree would help accelerate the emergence of more privacy friendly services.
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